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INTRODUCTION
“It has been rarely remarked how seldom a competitive spirit comes into play in
the relations among these [Renaissance Florentine] merchants. The vast
correspondence of Datini and of the Medici themselves (the largest collections of
business letters to survive before the sixteenth century) yields hardly a hint of
competition… However individualistic the Florentine world appears in contrast
with the tight corporate structures elsewhere – the Venetian senate, the Hanseatic
league, the south-German cartels, the London regulated companies – it was still
permeated with something of the spirit of medieval corporatism. This is what the
fiducia Florentine business historians make so much of really comes down to –
that sense of trust in one another that in a way also kept everyone in line.”2
What were the social and institutional factors that led to, and reinforced, the
precocious emergence of Florentine commercial capitalism,3 especially in the domain of
international merchant-banking? The dominant stream of answers, emphasized by
economic historians and by economists, focuses on the invention in late-medieval and
Renaissance Italy of a variety of innovative business techniques – bills of exchange,
double-entry bookkeeping, partnership contracts, commercial courts. If these impressive
organizational inventions are interpreted as facets of a broader rise of impersonal market
rationality, then a tension emerges in Florentine, and indeed in European, historiography
between economic historians and the work of social and political historians, who
emphasize the deeply personalistic – mainly familial and clientelist – character of social
relationships of the period. But were early-capitalist business techniques really the
leading edge of a breakthrough of the market from its traditional social shackles, as the
master narrative of modernization would have it? Or instead were economic relations in
the market embedded in, and hence reflective of, trends in the surrounding social and
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political networks of the time, as anthropologically and sociologically oriented economic
historians like Karl Polanyi4 have argued? Renaissance Florentine businessmen were not
only businessmen, after all, they were also fathers, neighbors, politicians, friends and
enemies, and patrons of the arts. But what implications, if any, did this overlap in roles
have for the organization and operation of economic markets?
In this article, we address these historical questions through both statistical and
textual analyses of Florentine commercial credit in the early Quattrocento. Our
conclusion will be that commercial credits among Florentine companies were indeed
highly correlated with a wide range of non-economic, social relationships among the
partners of these companies. Correlations between economic and social relations were
highest in the merchant-banking pinnacle of the Florentine economy – precisely in the
industries where reliance upon advanced capitalist business techniques was greatest. New
capitalist business techniques thus did not displace the oligarchic social networks of the
time, but rather built upon and formalized these relationships into markets. In particular,
family and neighborhood provided strong ‘traditionalist’ foundations to Renaissance
Florentine credit markets. But then republicanism, especially in the institutional form of
its elected city council, provided the political scaffolding for personalistic social networks
(and thus the economic credit networks built upon them) topologically to ‘open out’
toward expansive liquidity and growth, instead of to close inward into cliques and
corruption. Three mechanisms for this institutional impact of republicanism on the
emergence of credit markets are discussed: public certification of reputation (onore)
through co-optative elections, and both performative and network incorporations of
carefully filtered newcomers into relatively open elites5 of merchant-politicians.
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We shall develop this thesis about the structure and operation of the Renaissance
Florentine economy through the following steps: After describing our comprehensive
quantitative data on commercial credit from the 1427 tax census (catasto), we shall first
document the magnitude of reliance on commercial credit among Renaissance Florentine
companies, in various industries and markets. We shall then analyze these commercial
credits statistically, in order to measure correlations between business credits and various
social and political relations among the partners of paired companies. Finally, a small
sample of business letters from the period will be examined in order to illustrate the
cultural mentalité through which these statistical effects were produced. Florentine
businessmen’s frequent use of the language of friendship (amicizia) and of honor (onore)
in their letters to each other illustrates both how the language of social obligation deeply
infused their economic relations, and how business credit (in parallel to political
clientage) expanded the range of application of such personalistic mental models well
beyond the family and neighborhood social matrices of their origins. We conclude with
some implications for contemporary economic theory.

THE INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE OF FLORENTINE COMMERCIAL CREDIT
The statistical part of this study is possible because of the 1427 catasto or tax
census, described at length in the path breaking book of David Herlihy and Christiane
Klapisch-Zuber.6 Herlihy and Klapisch computerized large portions of this rich archival
source and analyzed their data primarily from a demographic and family-history
perspective. In addition to the data those authors coded, however, the catasto also
contains extensive lists of debtors and creditors, with amounts owed, for each household
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tax return, which McLean has coded.7 Business debitori and creditori were included
within the household tax return of the lead partner in the company – an indicator of the
incomplete separation of personal and business domains in the Florentine world. Such
lists of debts existed in the catasto because this very innovative taxation procedure
systematically assessed taxes on the basis of net wealth – that is, assets minus liabilities.
Debts, in other words, were tax deductible. Florentine law required the itemization of
outstanding credits as well as debts in order to give tax officials the ability to disallow
deductions, if one person’s declared debit did not equal the other person’s declared credit.
This remarkable breakthrough in public finance was possible only because of the
highly commercialized character of Florence’s underlying economy. Florentine
merchants filled out the business parts of their 1427 tax returns by copying summaries of
their account books into their tax declaration, as those account books existed as of the
date of the tax submission. Later catasti in Florence became notoriously unreliable, but
this first catasto seems to have been fairly accurate in the financial data it contained.8
Hence the 1427 catasto provides a high-resolution snapshot of the credits and debits of
the entire Florentine economy at one specific, fleeting moment in time. Virtually all of
the account books, out of which this information originally was drawn, subsequently have
been lost.9 This Florentine source therefore is remarkable: no other comparably
comprehensive data set about economic transactions exists for so early in modern or premodern history.10
The details of our coding of these creditori lists were reported in a previous
publication; hence that description will not be repeated here.11 Both business and
personal debts were coded, even though only business debits and credits will be analyzed
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in this article. The main coding rules relevant to this article were these: only debts of
value greater than or equal to 10 florins were coded, and only debts to other Florentines
were coded. An effect of the first coding rule is mostly to exclude artisans from our data
set. An effect of the second coding rule is that trading among Florentines (even when
they were resident abroad) is the focus of the data set, rather than trading between
Florentines and foreigners. The joint effect of both constraints is that the data describe,
with great richness, the structure of the export-oriented segment12 of the Florentine
economy, as of 1427. This was the core of the Florentine economy, including both
merchant-bankers and cloth manufacturers.
Within these constraints, coverage is thorough. Numerous passes through the
catasto were performed, in order to code a high percentage of companies’ accounts or
bilanci. Ultimately, 65.4% of the bilanci of active companies in our core industries were
coded. Comprehensive coding was least successful for international merchant companies
located abroad,13 for small low-quality wool companies whose accounts were hardest to
distinguish from the credits and debits of the household, and for a number of companies
who were connected to the export-oriented sector but were not formally located within
any of the key industries we targeted. For Florence- and Pisa-based banks, merchants,
merchant-banks, silk manufacturing, high-quality wool manufacturing, and cloth-retail
companies, the bilanci coding rate approached 80%. Debts were coded not among a
predefined list of all companies (which list did not exist until this study), but rather
among all companies and people meeting the above standards. As a result of our
procedure of coding credits to Florentine companies outside of previously coded bilanci,
however, even the debits of companies whose accounts were not coded directly often
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were found indirectly in the credit accounts of coded companies. Because of such crossreferencing, we were able to compile, for the first time, a complete census of companies
active in the year 1427. A tabulation of this census, industry by industry, is presented in
table 1. The detailed list of the companies underlying table 1 is publicly available on
Padgett’s web page: http://home.uchicago.edu/~jpadgett.
-- table 1 about here -We estimate, through procedures explained in an earlier version of this article14
that 33.4% of the total number of all debits and credits of companies participating in the
export-oriented industries of the Florentine economy were finally included in our data
set. And we estimate that 62.3% of the total monetary value of all such debits and credits
are included in our data set.15
The first stage in our analysis is descriptive: How important was commercial
credit to the Renaissance Florentine economy? In which markets did it figure most
centrally? In what types of economic exchanges was credit used? What was the ratio of
transactional to (multi-transactional) relational credit in various markets?
One common way in finance of measuring the magnitude of credit is leverage: the
ratio of outstanding debt to assets. The higher the ratio, the more important is credit in the
operation of the company. Higher leverage can generate higher profits, but at greater
economic risk. ‘Assets’ in the Florentine context primarily means the startup capital
specified in the partnership contract, called corpo. Table 2 reports leverage so defined,
and it also provides two more liberal definitions of ‘assets’, which progressively add to
corpo the partners’ reinvestments of past profit and company inventory.16
-- table 2 about here --
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Using the strict definition of leverage, our findings are that Florentine merchantbanks were leveraged on average at 5:1 of their corpo; that Florentine cloth retail and
dyeing companies were leveraged at a little over 2:1 of their corpo; and that Florentine
cloth production companies, wool and silk, were leveraged at about 1:1 of their corpo.
These leverage ratios are not really comparable to modern figures, because modern firms
borrow for the most part from specialized banks, whereas these companies borrowed for
the most part from their trading and exchange partners. Nonetheless, the ordering of these
ratios is consistent with the known facts that merchant-banks were generally more
profitable as personal investments, but also more risky, than were wool and silk
production companies.17 In general, it is fair to say that virtually all Florentine
companies, but especially merchant-banks, were highly leveraged and that most of their
business was conducted on credit.
On average, larger and wealthier companies operated on higher leverage than did
smaller companies.18 The most extreme example in our data set was Cosimo de’ Medici’s
bank branch in Rome, which had the highest outstanding debt of any company in
Florence, yet its startup capital was zero, generating a leverage ratio of infinity.19 Such an
extreme case makes it clear that name, reputation, and connections were more central in
the generation of commercial credit in fifteenth-century Florence than were economic
assets, narrowly defined as security. Given the pervasiveness of doing business on credit,
without other firms being willing to extend credit to a given firm, that firm could not
really be in business at all.20 This was the mechanism that “kept everyone in line.”
Figure 1, in the on-line electronic version of this article, presents a computerized
visualization of our commercial credit data, using a network visualization program called
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Pajek. Figure 2 visualizes these company-credit data differently, as Leontief input-output
flows of credit between and within industries. In particular, figure 2 shows observed
deviations of credit flows from randomly expected credit flows, the latter calculated on
the basis of aggregate volumes of industry credit alone. Four specific trading patterns are
worth highlighting in this global macroeconomic picture of inter-industry credit flow:
(a) Credit flow among merchant-banks of all three sorts (Florentine merchantbanks located in foreign countries, Florentine merchant trading companies
located in Pisa, and domestic banks and merchant-banks located in Florence)
was massive. Metaphorically speaking, the merchant-banking sector was a
whirlwind of products, bills of exchange, and credits cycling around.
(b) Woolen-cloth consignments, from woolen-cloth manufacturers (lanaiuoli),
flowed more to local cloth retailers (ritagliatori) in 1427 than to merchantbankers.21
(c) Silk-cloth consignments, from silk-cloth manufacturers (setaiuoli), flowed
more to merchant-bankers in 1427 than to local cloth retailers.22 In reverse
direction, setaiuoli received a higher flow of credits (including raw silk) from
domestic merchant-banks, relative to statistical expectation, than did
lanaiuoli.23
(d) Silk firms in 1427 exchanged with and gave credit to each other, whereas
wool firms for the most part did not.
-- figure 2 about here -Credit pattern (a) documents statistically the observation of Goldthwaite in the
opening quotation that Florentine merchant-banks were not an industry of independent
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firms in competition. They were instead a cooperative banking and trading network
system, with ‘competing’ merchant-bankers providing much liquidity and business to
each other. This is the central economic fact that we seek to understand.24
Credit/trade patterns (b), (c) and (d) reflect recent trends in the Florentine
economy in the early fifteenth century. The core of the Florentine economy in the
fourteenth century had been the finishing, production, and export of woolen cloth. In the
late 1200s and early 1300s, Florentine merchant-bankers in the Calimala guild imported
unfinished cloth from Flanders and exported finished and dyed woolen cloth. By the mid
1300s, Florentine merchant-bankers in the Cambio and other guilds imported raw wool
and exported completely manufactured woolen cloth. The Florentine wool-production
industry, however, suffered serious and protracted contraction between 1373 and 1437,
due primarily to aggressive expansion of woolen cloth production in England.25 The rawmaterial flow of prized English wool, upon which the high-end San Martino segment of
woolen cloth production in Florence had depended, diminished, forcing a higher
percentage of production of lower-quality woolen cloth, called garbo. The San Martino
woolen cloth still left was sold both to merchant-bankers – especially those with
warehouses in Pisa – and to ritagliatori, whereas garbo woolen cloth in this period was
sold overwhelmingly to ritagliatori.26
The Florentine merchant community and government, under the political control
of the popolani-based Albizzi oligarchy at the time, responded to this economic crisis by
trying aggressively to develop silk-cloth production,27 in order to substitute for declining
woolen-cloth production. The mechanism of this sponsorship was liberal credit and
investment from upper-class merchant-bankers to new-men silk manufacturers.28
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Woolen-cloth production still exceeded the newer silk-cloth production in total volume,
and also in total employment, but our data show that this centrally encouraged industrial
transformation from wool to silk was well underway in 1427. The credit mechanisms
analyzed in this article help to explain how the Florentine economy successfully adapted
to its challenging international situation.29
What was the transactional content of the cross-industry company-credit flow
depicted in figure 2? Table 3 provides information about the specific goods funded
through credits, broken down by aggregated industrial clusters and by transactional
versus relational credits, to be explained shortly. Unfortunately only 11% of our credits
had their content or purpose listed in the catasto. No doubt all of these purposes were
described in detail in the original account books, but there was no tax reason for
businessmen or their accountants to copy this text into their summary tax returns.
Nonetheless, even an 11% sample gives an adequate picture, as long as one is content
with coarse-grained resolution.
-- table 3 about here -The modal activities reported in table 3 are what any knowledgeable historian
would expect. Namely, among merchant-banks, the modal type of credit was the current
account (conto corrente). In these cases, a single recorded “credit” in the tax returns
summarized many underlying business transactions.30 As per their monikers, merchantbanks engaged in both merchant and banking activity, hence the content of these
transactions was diverse. But the primary international banking transaction was the bill of
exchange.31 As such, bills of exchange were transactions, and conti correnti were the
formalized economic relations containing these and other transactions. Between
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merchant-banks and other companies, the primary credit activity was trading raw material
for cloth on consignment. Banking services also were provided on credit by merchantbankers to textile producers. Accounts called conti di esercizio orchestrated recurrent
trade among such trading partners.32 Conti di esercizio between merchant-bankers and
textile manufacturers were not as common as were conti correnti between merchantbankers. Among other mostly cloth-producing companies, the modal credit activity was
lending raw materials and cloth to each other, on a transactional basis.
‘Current accounts’ and ‘accounts of use’ were the accounting vessels that
contained and measured strong economic credit relationships among Florentine
companies. Double-entry bookkeeping slowly percolated throughout northern Italy
during the first half of the fourteenth century, but it became widespread in Florence only
in the late fourteenth century.33 Bilateral format in Florentine merchant account books –
the physical layout of the pages often associated34 with double-entry bookkeeping –
became widespread in the 1380s, precisely in conjunction with the invention and rapid
diffusion of the partnership system.35 From the point of view of credit, the most
significant aspect of that accounting change is its instantiation of the current account,36
which visually was displayed so neatly in bilateral-format pages. Simplifying a bit,37 to
open up an account book in bilateral format was to place into clear sight the writer’s own
economic relationship with a single person or company. Credits (both monetary amounts
and descriptions of content) between the writer and that person or company were listed
on one side of the open account book, and debts of the writer with that same person or
company on the facing page. Such accounts usually were initiated with an opening
deposit or a credit of some sort, but after that initiation a whole series of transactions
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ensued, with accounting money (not necessarily physical money38) flowing both in and
out, all registered neatly and precisely in parallel columns. Earlier more primitive singleentry account books, in contrast, were registers of the writer’s transactions, ordered by
date irrespective of alter, each described in paragraphs with complicated systems of
cross-reference to help figure out whether the credit was ever repaid.39 To put this
accounting development simply: the foundational organizing unit of single-entry
bookkeeping was the transaction, while the organizing unit of bilateral double-entry
bookkeeping was the economic relationship.40 Conti correnti between merchant-bankers
and conti di esercizio between merchants and manufacturers were the most advanced
technical means in Florence through which economic credits were managed.
At the international level, where different currencies were involved, current
accounts could become quite complex, internally differentiating into four separate
financial components: nostro/our and vostro/your accounts for each merchant-banking
side of the ongoing economic relation.41 Essentially paired companies began to maintain
complementary and quasi-permanent ‘bins’ within each other into which their credits and
debts could be transferred at will on an ongoing basis. Such networks of open-ended
credit involved both partnership systems, with legally separate branches linked through
common partners, and separately owned companies who did frequent business with each
other – so-called corrispondenti. In our section on business letters, we shall have
occasion to see corrispondenti relations more closely in action.
Anticipating the statistical results of next section about social embeddedness, we
point out here that paired current accounts, implementing corrispondenti relations, are
not inconsistent in form from reciprocity in anthropological social exchange.42 Both in
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primitive social exchange and in the mathematically sophisticated conti correnti, one
party offers a ‘gift’ to the other, thereby ‘making’ or constructing that person (or his
business), and is repaid not by cash but by reciprocal gifts, which thereby ‘make’ in turn
the initiating person (or his business). A credit or loan, in this social-exchange
understanding, is just an unreciprocated gift. Much recurrent business was conducted by
Florentine companies in this open-ended gift-exchange manner of reciprocity, without
requiring cash,43 even though of course serious risks of bad debts and cheating were
incurred thereby.
By pointing out the homology between early-capitalist and traditional social
exchange, we are not claiming that Renaissance Florence was no different from New
Guinea. The level of mathematical sophistication is vastly different. But we are claiming
that, despite the absence of personal information in Florentine account books, many of
these accounts (particularly the most elaborate of them) represented the formalization of
personal relations, not their displacement by impersonal relations. Sometimes the social
preceded in time the development of the economic relation; sometimes the economic
preceded in time the development of the social; but either way economic and social
relational logics had a strong tendency to bleed into each other in Renaissance Florentine
markets.44
An important subsidiary message in table 3 about exchange content is its
diversity. We have tabulated on the right-hand column of table 3 the dispersion of
multiple credits across content categories, between specific exchange partners, in those
pairs of companies where we were lucky enough to have more than one instance of
content reported. With the exception of trading among cloth producers and ritagliatori,
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which was fairly specialized in character, the goods and services exchanged among
merchant-banks and between merchant-banks and other companies were remarkably
wide ranging in content. In recurrent exchange relationships between Florentine
companies, merchant activities, banking activities and account activities (which really
could cover anything: merchandise, bills of exchange, even daughters’ dowries) were all
mixed up. While distinct in terms of guild membership, therefore, upper-tier Florentine
companies were not sharply specialized in terms of actual exchange behavior. On the
margins, Florentine industries blended into one another, with a single company quite
capable of morphing its business into another ‘industry’.45 Such company plasticity, we
believe, was a macro-industrial-structure consequence of the generalist social exchange
instantiated (and precisely measured) within conti correnti and conti di esercizio.
Motivated by our knowledge of current accounts, in table 4 we move on to
disaggregate overall credit flows into transactional and relational credits. “Relational
credits” we define as credits between companies who had more than one cross-sectionally
observed credit between them. “Transactional credits,” in complement, are those credits
between companies who had only one observed credit between them.46 Relational credits
in turn are of two types: (a) reciprocal credits, where credits flowed in both directions,
and (b) multiple credits, where more than one outstanding credit existed in a single
direction. Reciprocal credits are our observable proxies for corrispondenti relationships.47
-- table 4 about here -It is not correct to interpret relational credits as “personal” and transactional
credits as “impersonal,” because any credit at all implies that the creditor knew the debtor
at least well enough to judge him credit-worthy. But relational credits go beyond mere
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knowledge of credit-worthiness to connote a social relationship of trust. “Multiple
credits” either means extending to someone a second (or more) credit even before they
have paid off their first debt, or it means maintaining multiple accounts with the other.
Some sort of trust in or deep character assessment of the debtor by the creditor seems
virtually a prerequisite for this intense a level of repeated lending behavior.
Reciprocity epitomizes the anthropological logic of social exchange, discussed
above, in which ‘gifts’ flow open-endedly back and forth between the exchange parties,
both in order to create social obligations and in order economically to help to ‘make’
each other. It is notable in the Florentine case that such credits flowed back and forth (for
example, two credits one way and three credits the other way), without them being
aggregated into a net balance (for example, into one net credit owed). Each credit account
ultimately had to be cleared separately, even if not necessarily in cash. Sometimes in our
data reciprocal credits occurred through two-way transactions being itemized and
recorded individually, but more commonly they occurred through paired current accounts
that each party held in the books of the other, as has already been mentioned.
Within the high-volume merchant-banking sector, table 4 shows that 45% of the
credits in our data were reciprocal credits, that 50% of the credits were multiple credits,
and that 63% of the credits were relational credits of either version. Relational exchange,
in other words, was fundamental to the operation of Florentine merchant-banks.
Between banks and other companies, and among other companies, the proportion
of total credits in relational form was not as high as it was among merchant-banks
themselves, but it was still substantial. 33% of the credits in our data between banks and
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other companies were relational credits, and 29% of the credits among non-bank
companies were relational in character.
By these measures, credits within merchant-banking industries were on average
more ‘personal’, both in relational-credit style and in embedding in non-economic social
networks (see below), than were credits involving the textile-manufacturing and clothretail industries. Relational credit was the non-specialized social-exchange logic through
which the highest volume of Florentine commercial credit flowed, precisely recorded in
account books through conti correnti and conti di esercizio. Regardless of whether credit
was relational or transactional, however, commercial credit was crucial to the operation
of all advanced sectors of the Renaissance Florentine economy.

STATISICAL ANALYSIS OF FLORENTINE COMMERCIAL CREDIT
Florentine businessmen were not just businessmen. They were also fathers,
brothers, neighbors, in-laws, republican office-holders, faction fighters, humanists, and
patrons of the arts. The colloquialism “Renaissance man” reflects the Florentine social
reality that the intellectual, economic, and political activities of its elite merchantrepublicans were remarkably diverse.48 Among their many activities, the pursuit of
business did not necessarily assume first place in their career ambitions or in their
biographies. The average number of years that a Florentine banker was actually doing
banking was only 8.2 years.49 Success in business often was a stepping stone toward
other elite activities, like becoming a city councilor, an ambassador, a rentier, or even an
art patron or humanist scholar.50 Cosimo de’ Medici was not unique in this regard. In
such a social context, it should come as no surprise that “there is scant reason to expect
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that Renaissance economic exchanges, occurring within dense and multi-textured social
networks, to lack broader cultural meanings shared by other Renaissance exchange
systems: gift giving, hospitality, the exchange of greetings, or the exchange of women.”51
The strategic implication of this dense social-network overlap is that “single actions [such
as the granting of business credit] are moves in many games at once.”52
Renaissance Florence was not a large city by modern standards – in 1427 only
37,246 people.53 Thus most Florentine businessmen knew much about each other, both in
business and outside of business, if only through reputation. Even were a Florentine
businessman to desire to shut the doors of his office and to withdraw from the inquiring
eyes of the social networks around him,54 reputation and the subsequent flow of business
credit and business opportunities would force him to stop that, or else he would fail in his
business. In this section, we shall analyze more specifically exactly which social
networks were important for which commercial credit behaviors in which industries.
In statistical analyses to follow, the commercial credits already described will
become the dependent variables. For social-context independent variables, Padgett and
his assistants have collected and computerized a wide variety of primary-source and
secondary-source data about the attributes and networks of these businessmen and
others:55 namely, patrilineage,56 marriage,57 neighborhood,58 personal wealth,59 political
office-holding,60 voting,61 social-class membership,62 and factional affiliation.63 These
data will be used to reconstruct the “dense and multitextured social network” context
within which Florentine commercial credit operated.
In an appendix in the on-line version of this article, we present our full logitregression statistical analyses of commercial credits among our 1427 companies, using
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various social attributes and social networks of the Florentine partners who owned them
as independent variables. For each separate market, logit regressions were run on
dichotomized credits as dependent variables64 – first for all commercial credits, and then
for credits subdivided into reciprocal-credit and asymmetric-credit65 subsets. In the
interest of saving publication space, we extract only salient statistically significant
coefficients from that more complete appendix to present in table 5. Asterisks in the table
refer to degrees of statistical significance.66 Details on variable construction are presented
both in the on-line appendix and in table 5.
-- table 5 about here -For those readers who do not consult the full appendix, it is important to note that
more variables were included in the full logit regressions than have been extracted to
highlight in table 5. As statistical controls, five variables were included to correct for
tautologies and sample biases in the data: (a) baseline null expectations of numbers of
credits between companies, based on the sizes of the companies alone,67 (b) two dummy
variables for whether company accounts were coded directly from the catasto or were
inferred indirectly from trading partners’ accounts, and (c) the total taxable personal
wealth of all partners in creditor companies and in debtor companies, as reported in the
catasto. Not surprisingly the first three of these control variables were almost always
statistically significant. In addition, eight other substantive variables were analyzed but
are not reported in table 5, because we failed to find more than random68 statistical
significance in their estimated coefficients: namely, (a) neighborhood at the coarsegrained level of quarter (above and beyond the more fine-grained gonfaloni), (b) three
social-class endogamy variables (percentage ‘upper class’ popolani and magnate
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partners, percentage ‘middle class’ new-men and new-new-men partners, and percentage
‘lower class’ families-never-admitted-to-Priorate partners), and (c) four political offices
other than Priorate or city council – namely, the Buonuomini (or dodici), the Gonfalonieri
(or seidici), the guild consuls, and members of the Mercanzia or commercial court. It is
therefore a substantive finding, albeit a negative one, that quarter, social class,69 and
political offices other than Priorate did not consistently affect commercial credit in 1427.
A ninth variable not included in table 5 – namely in-law marriage among partners in
different companies – was frequently statistically significant, but that is not highlighted
because the number of documented partners across different companies who were direct
in-laws, at the nuclear family level, was quite small.70 Finally, the cluster option within
STATA’s logit-regression procedure was employed, using company ID as the finegrained categorical variable, in order to control for potentially important missing factors
for which we do not have data.71
To facilitate later comparison with business letters, the findings in table 5 will be
discussed within categories that our Florentines would understand – namely famiglia,
amicizia, onore, and finally partnership systems.
Famiglia:
Instead of taking an essentialist position on the historiographically sensitive
question of what was the Florentine family,72 we chose to measure this four ways and “let
the data decide.” Two companies were measured to have a “nuclear family” relation with
each other by the percentage that partners in the two different companies were members
of the same nuclear family (that is, father and sons, or brothers). Two companies were
measured to have a “patrilineage family” relation by the percentage that partners in the
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two companies were members of the same patrilineage, above and beyond nuclear family
(that is, cousins or uncles with same last name). Two companies were measured to have
an “in-law” relation by the percentage that one set of partners married into the nuclear
families of the other set. And two companies were measured to have a “parentado
family” relation by the percentage that one set of partners had the same last names as the
other set of partners’ wives.
Not very surprisingly, family relations among partners in different companies,
when they were present, exerted frequent and strong effects on those companies’ credit
behavior toward each other. Indeed pooling across the three ways of running the
regressions (namely, all credits, reciprocal credits, and asymmetric credits) reveals the
relative frequency of “family” statistical effects to be rank ordered in the intuitive way –
namely, nuclear family (14 significant coefficients) > patrilineage family (7 significant
coefficients) > parentado family (5 significant coefficients).73 All versions of Florentine
“family,” in other words, affected Florentine commercial behavior.
These statistical effects are not surprising because when family relations
interpenetrated commercial relations, credit exchanges between companies became as
much social obligations as economic investments. “Social obligations enforcing
economic investments” or “economic investments enacting social obligations”: either
way of interpreting the empirical correlation is consistent with our data. Thus insisting on
the causal priority of one side over the other is probably a mistake. We shall see in our
business letters that even non-kin sometimes evoked fictional-kinship language with each
other, which strengthened the obligatory connotations of economic exchange. In all
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domains, not excluding the economic, kinship was central in Renaissance Florentine
thinking and behavior.
While true in almost74 all Florentine markets, there is a remarkable density of nine
significant family coefficients in the four reciprocal-credit markets involving
international merchant-bankers. Reciprocal credits are our observable proxies for
corrispondenti relations, often implemented through paired conti correnti. When
Florentine businessmen were resident outside of their native soil, they relied even more
than they did otherwise on family as the social ligaments upon which they constructed
their corrispondenti. Apparently in their most risky business climates, Florentines tended
to close ranks within intimate social relations for their deepest credit connections. Since
Florentine families in international business were spread geographically all over Europe,
some of the heaviest early fifteenth-century flow of international finance throughout
Europe coursed through upper-class75 Florentine families’ veins, making them very
wealthy indeed.76
Amicizia:
Our imperfect proxy for ‘friends’ is ‘neighbors’. We acknowledge the
imperfection of the match, but neighbors are measurable in our data whereas friends are
not. The social intimacy of Florentine neighborhoods has been documented extensively in
the literature,77 so the assumption is well grounded that neighborhood was highly
correlated with social-interaction frequency, even though close interaction could lead to
hostility as well to friendship within neighborhoods.78
Gonfaloni were the sixteen administrative districts or wards into which Florence
was divided geographically. We measured a “same gonfalone” relationship between
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companies as the percentage of times that the partners in two different companies lived in
the same gonfalone. “Same quarter” (excluding same gonfalone) relations were measured
similarly.
The statistical findings regarding “same gonfalone” are remarkably sharp: At very
high significance levels, markets involving domestic merchant-banks, resident in
Florence, almost always relied on neighborhood socially to structure their commercial
credit relations. Put simply, Florentine banks and merchant-banks resident in Florence
disproportionately extended commercial credit to those wool-manufacturing companies,
silk-manufacturing companies, international merchant-banks, and other domestic banks
and merchant-banks, whose partners lived in the same gonfaloni as partners of the focal
company. We interpret this as amicizia. Whereas Florentine international merchantbanking business was organized substantially through family relations, Florentine
domestic-banking business was organized substantially through friends. As was the case
with the association between family and international corrispondenti, moreover, domestic
merchant-bankers and their recurrent exchange partners frequently referred to each other
in business letters as friends, whether or not they ‘really’ were. Causality went as much
from business to friends as it did from friends to business.79
In another article,80 Padgett has demonstrated that the effect of neighborhood on
marriage, while always statistically significant, declined in absolute importance from
1300 to 1500. Whether a similar temporal decline in Florence was true for economic
credit cannot be assessed with data on 1427.
Onore:
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The Italian word onore means both “honor” and “political office,” reflecting the
historical reality in Italian republics that to be elected to a public office was conceived to
be an honor, bespeaking respect from one’s fellow citizens. Office-holding in the
Florentine republic was not a matter for professional politicians. Many normal ‘amateur’,
but respected and articulate, citizens were elected to serve short stints81 in Florentine
public office, taking temporary and unpaid time out from their normal business or other
pursuits. It is surprising to modern eyes to see how anxious and honored Florentine
republican citizens were to be elected by their social superiors and peers to high political
office, with no overt reward or payment other than prestige.82
As mentioned above, no political office other than the top office – namely, the
Priorate or city council – had consistent statistical effects on commercial-credit behavior
among Florentine companies. But republican service in this very top office of Priorate,
measured as percentage of both companies’ partners serving in the Priorate prior to 1427,
had frequent and strong consequences for commercial credit in all markets involving
domestic merchant-banks.83 This was especially true for reciprocal credits, but it was true
also for all credits and for asymmetric credits as well. In this regard the variable
“Priorate” behaved statistically just like “same gonfaloni.” In addition to amicizia, the
social logic of onore, conceptualized as personal honor but manifest as republican officeholding, was at the core of commercial credit among companies dealing with merchantbanks resident in Florence.
The concentration of strong statistical Priorate effects on commercial credit
especially in markets related to domestic banking and to domestic merchant-banking
makes sense. Florentine international merchant-bankers were scattered all over Europe,
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far away from Priorate service back home. And the density of social ties observing and
calibrating onore, measured in scrutiny voting, was higher at home in Florence than it
was abroad. Public reputation could not really be ignored anywhere, but it was especially
salient and observable at home.
It has been shown previously that political office-holding had effects on business
and wealth, via state finance, at the very highest echelons of the elite.84 However, this is
the first demonstration of a pervasive office-holding effect on business throughout wide
segments of Florentine society. Perhaps this widespread causal effect is related to the fact
that eligibility for the Priorate had increased substantially from 1343 to 1427.85
In table 5, we also report statistical results for scrutiny voting and for political
factions. Scrutiny voting in 1433, measured as the votes received by the sum of the
highest vote receivers in each company, had numerous statistical effects on commercial
credit in 1427, but these effects were scattered among international and domestic
merchant-banking markets. Likewise factional membership in the Medici and Albizzi
parties of 1433 had numerous statistical effects on commercial credit in 1427, but these
also were scattered among merchant-banking markets. These independent variables from
1433 were included to predict dependent-variable outcomes in 1427 under the
presumption of stability in political attitudes over time. The lack of clear market
patterning may be related to this empirically unavoidable slipperiness in dates.
At the very least, we can conclude that “politics mattered” in economic credit
markets in 1427. It is even clearer that “economics mattered” in the early 1430’s
construction of the Medici political party or faction.86 In Renaissance Florence,
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commercial behavior, especially in merchant-banking, was no more segregated from
political partisanship than it was from kinship or friendship or republican office-holding.

Partnership systems:
The partnership system was a new organizational form in the history of financial
capitalism, invented in Renaissance Florence.87 Partnership systems were sets of legally
autonomous companies, with their own account books, linked in ownership through
single persons or through a holding company of controlling partners. Usually, though not
necessarily, the linked companies in question were diversified across industries, with
international merchant-banks and domestic merchant-banks dominating in number, and
with domestic merchant-banks serving as the managerial headquarters. Padgett and
McLean (2006) documented the rapid diffusion of this organizational form, after its
Ciompi-revolt induced birth in 1383.
Table 5 reveals strong credit interconnections in 1427 among companies linked in
partnership systems throughout the merchant-banking sector and occasionally in other
sectors as well. This is not surprising, for companies linked through common owners
presumably were ordered to cooperate, even though they were legally autonomous.88 In
addition, within the domestic-banking industry, partnership systems themselves
cooperated strongly and significantly among each other through reciprocal credits. This
demonstrates coordination among titular ‘competitors’ at the very apex of the Florentine
economy. Senior-partner leaders of these partnership systems became captains of finance
in Florence, monitoring and managing large credit flows across multiple markets through
their visible hands.
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Unlike had been the case before the Ciompi revolt by lower-class wool workers in
1378, international and domestic merchant-banking industries became organizationally
interconnected through this innovative organizational mechanism of the diversified
partnership system. Such concentration of ownership of multiple companies into fewer
hands is hard to understand without placing it into its political context: namely, the
consolidation of a city-wide oligarchy among elite Florentine merchant-republicans, in
response to the Ciompi revolt.89 Economic market restructuring through partnership
systems was one aspect of this broader political and social transformation in elite
structure. Through this elite-transformation process, economic partnership systems took
their place among the social-network constituents of that elite, transforming merchants on
the one side and republicans on the other even more deeply into multi-faceted merchantrepublicans.
Volume of social-context effects:
Statistical significance is a necessary but not sufficient criterion for assessing the
volume of any factor’s impact. “Nuclear family,” for example, frequently exerted a
significant impact on companies’ commercial credit to each other, when such close
family relations linked those companies. But there are not really enough brothers to go
around to organize an entire credit market. Table 6, therefore, reports the percentage of
commercial credits affected by the significant social-context variables reported in table 5.
We report volume only for markets involving merchant-banks, because retail ritagliatori
markets were shown in table 5 mostly to have operated “impersonally,” that is,
independently of our social-context variables.
-- table 6 about here --

28
Firstly, the “All [variables] together” column on the right-hand side of table 6
reinforces our interpretation of reciprocal credits as social exchange. In merchantbanking markets (except for “International M-B / Silk”), from 42% to 96% of reciprocal
commercial credits were rooted in “dense and multi-textured social networks.”
Reciprocal credits were the inner skeleton of merchant-banking markets in Renaissance
Florence, and these were constructed largely out of social-network materials.
Secondly, non-reciprocal or asymmetric credits were on the whole not as socially
embedded as were reciprocal credits. But in two out of three markets internal to the
merchant-banking sector, they were: 76% and 89% of the non-reciprocated commercial
credits in the “Domestic M-B / International M-B” market and in the “among Domestic
M-Bs” market could be correlated with measurable social contexts, respectively.
Putting both the reciprocal and the non-reciprocal sides together, the global
economic-network portrait that emerges is roughly one of concentric circles: (a) within
the Florentine export-oriented economy as a whole, the merchant-banking sector was the
credit core (see figure 1), (b) within the merchant-banking sector itself, reciprocal credits,
often instantiated in corrispondenti relations, were the credit core (see tables 4 and 6),
and (c) reciprocal credits, in turn, were built upon social-network foundations (see table
5). Conversely, as one moved away from the merchant-banking inner core of the
Florentine economy, out toward its ritagliatori periphery, commercial credit relations
became more non-reciprocal and “impersonal,” in the sense of not having correlations
with observable other social networks. In general, the Florentine economy was socially
embedded. But more specifically Florentine merchant-banks – in their commercial
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relations both with each other and with other companies – were embedded in, and
regulated by, the social networks of a politically open republican oligarchy.
Even in 1427, Florentine commercial credit markets stood very firmly on the
‘late-medieval’ social foundations of family and neighborhood. Yet two ‘Renaissance’
institutional innovations – partnership systems and republican electoral reforms – pushed
families and neighborhoods into greater network intercalation with each other, at least
within the political reggimento,90 thereby spanning previous deep cleavages and divides.
The complementary consequences of this increased social-network connectivity were
greater liquidity in credit markets91 and greater elite consolidation in politics.92
At the elite pinnacle of the economy, diversified partnership systems bridged not
families but industries. This new post-1383 type of Florentine economic network
emerged out of political reaction to the Ciompi revolt, and breached the previously sharp
segregation of business partnerships into distinct guilds.93 At the micro level of
organizational role, senior partners in partnership systems evolved from being primarily
industry-specific entrepreneurs into being primarily cross-industry financiers.94
Republicanism did not affect the organization of Florentine credit markets in as
direct a way as did partnership systems. But ex-members of the city council provided a
pool of highly respected citizens, certified95 to have honor (onore). Such persons were a
filtered subset of citizens whose past behavior was judged to be exemplary, as citizens
but also, as we shall see in the Dati example below, as businessmen. They were elected in
the first place because they were deeply enmeshed in Florentine networks and institutions
– hardly the types to cut and run. Arguably such electoral filtering became stronger on the
individualistic and elite defined grounds of “character” after the post-Ciompi electoral
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reforms than before, when voting had been based more on group membership.96 Of
course, being a good citizen was not necessarily the same thing as being a reliable
businessman. But our modernist distinction between generalist ‘honor’ or ‘character’ and
economically specialized ‘credit worthiness’ was not one that the Florentines shared. For
them, a person was worthy of credit, economic or social, because he was honorable.97
In addition to its public certification function, republican election into the
reggimento provided direct-access benefits to budding businessmen: (a) linguistic
performance in verbally oriented political councils increased the level of direct
observation that merchant-republicans had of each other, and (b) indirect introductions,
recommendations, and gossip about reputation functioned far more efficiently within the
republican elite than outside it. Thus although the direct material rewards for
businessmen joining the Priorate were non-existent, the indirect payoffs were substantial
for Florentine businessmen trying to operate in commercial credit markets.
A dramatic example of this Florentine link between economic credit and
republican election is provided in the diary of Gregorio Dati, edited by Gene Brucker.
Goro Dati was one of the successful, new-man silk merchants in our 1427 data set, but
earlier in 1408, after twenty-four years of partnerships in the silk business, he suffered
this fate:
“As a result of the adversity which overtook us in Barcelona, and of the lawsuits
which followed it, and of the suspicions concerning [my brother’s] ventures and
the calumnies that were spread around, we were very short of credit. So we were
forced to withdraw from business and collect whatever we could to pay our
creditors, borrowing from friends and using all our ingenuity, suffering losses,
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high interest, and expenses in order to avoid bankruptcy and shame. Although my
partner was in favor of going bankrupt so as to avoid some losses and
expenditures, I was resolved to face ruin rather than loss of honor.”98
After four years of financial hardship but also of demonstrable integrity,
“I was in debt for over 3,000 florins. That same year 1412, my name was drawn
to be Standard-bearer of Justice, and I served in that office. That was the
beginning of my recovery.”99
This financial recovery through revived commercial credit was healthy enough to allow
Dati to report a taxable wealth of 3,368 florins in the 1427 catasto.100 This placed him
among the wealthiest 7% of Florentine households at that time, rebounding from less than
nothing.
Table 6 shows that, out of all of our various social-context effects, “political
embedding,” and in particular past Priorate membership, had the largest volume of
impact on commercial credit. Family and neighborhood provided strong traditionalist
foundations, upon which Florentine commercial credit could grow. Partnership systems
newly coordinated the cross-industry apex of the commercial-credit system. But previous
election to city council induced the broadest reach and connectivity in Florentine credit
markets.
One common criticism of personalistic markets is that they are inherently selflimiting in extensibility and scale, compared to impersonal markets. This criticism has
less force when discussing topologically open-ended social networks, like porous elites,
than it does when discussing topologically closed and fragmented social networks, like
families. Florentine merchant-banking credit markets were very personalistic. Yet they
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geographically radiated all over Europe and brokered much of Europe’s international
trade, without reliable judicial support. The organizational secret of the Florentines in
their markets was their blending of multiple personalistic social networks into dense but
socially open merchant-republican elites, who reciprocally offered commercial credit to
each other, not as competitors, but as ‘honorable’ Renaissance men. Using gossip,
ostracism and reputation to discipline their wide extension of credit to each other, such
men “kept everyone in line” through the same “dense and multi-textured social networks”
that had created them in the first place.

BUSINESS LETTERS AND THE MENTALITÉ OF CREDIT
We close this article with a textual analysis of business letters from roughly our
time period, in order to illustrate the discursive framings and the cognitive mentalité of
the Florentine businessmen who produced the commercial-credit behavior documented
above. Because of the importance of relational credits in our statistical analysis, we focus
on letters between corrispondenti – that is, between legally autonomous companies that
had extensive and recurrent two-way business with each other.101 In particular, we
examine published business letters to and from the Francesco Datini company in Milan102
and unpublished business letters to and from the Andrea de’ Bardi company in
Florence.103 Other relevant sources are occasionally mentioned as well. Within this small
sample of business letters, we highlight Florentine businessmen’s use of the language of
friendship (amicizia) and of honor (onore) in discussing deals with each other.
An important theoretical point in our discussion will be the two-way causal
relationship between language and behavior: On the one hand, linguistic expressions
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reference ‘real’ social relationships and obligations in the writers’ past experience. On the
other hand, Florentine linguistic tropes and learned cognitive models, like ‘family’
(famiglia) and ‘friends’ (amici), were extended far beyond their objective references, as
businessmen sought to frame and interpret each others’ market actions in such terms.
This loose-coupling or ambiguity between Florentine language and behavior enabled both
the creative construction of new social relationships104 and the creative construction of
lies.105 On the whole, the benefits of the former apparently outweighed the correlated
costs of the latter.106 Linguistic ambiguity was the medium through which economic and
social relational logics bled into each other (or conversely, emerged out of each other).
Examples of corrispondenti relations, in Florentine businessmen’s own words, are
these:
“Of the affairs you still have to complete here, point yourself still towards Pisa
with my company there, and also write often to me in Bruges, because I am going
to live there, and in three days I am leaving here to go there. With the grace of
God I will stay there a little while, and if there is anything I can do for you, write
to me of it and I will do it, for you and for your whole company, as if it were for
myself alone.”107

“Anything that comes to you for us, you may commit to Paris or London, if it be
to your own [company] there, to ours in Barcelona, in Lucca to Bartolomeo
Belbani & co, and in Venice to the Medici: continue in this way if no one
instructs you otherwise. We do not wish you to lend [credere] our money, nor the
money of our company to any Venetian or Lombard, nor to Antonio Quarti & co,
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nor to Niccolaio Tonghi, nor to Filippo Rapondi or others that might bring
business to you from Dino Rapondi of Paris. Follow these instructions, and with
the others [with whom you correspond] do as you wish and as if it were for
yourself, having always due regard to lending well and, again, not to get yourself
too indebted with anyone, and especially with Diamante degli Alberti & co.”108
Within very explicitly stated constraints, partners in corrispondenti relationships
both offered to do whatever each other requested and were authorized to take
discretionary action on behalf of each other, taking advantage of local opportunities. The
accounting methods for keeping tabs on these discretionary actions were the paired conti
correnti and conti di esercizio discussed above. To spell out the mechanics of this:
correspondent A would take discretionary action on behalf of correspondent B, charging
B’s current account in A’s book, and recording therein A’s actions taken and B’s
financial commitments.109 This was really A giving credit to B, since this was B’s
account money but A’s disposable cash being used. Typically B would do likewise for A,
thereby paying back the “loan” not with cash but with reciprocated discretionary actions.
If all went well, which it did not always, each side actively made money for the other.
The word “to lend” in these and other Renaissance business letters is credere,
which normally means “to believe” or “to believe in.”110 The language of medieval and
Renaissance Italian expresses the idea that to offer someone credit typically meant having
confidence in them, not only financially but also morally. “To give credit” and “to
believe in someone” were essentially the same idea. Having credit was a sign that others
trusted you to record your debts accurately, regard them seriously, and pay them
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promptly. It was also a sign that you were a person of character and honor, in more
domains than just the economic.
Amicizia:
While fifteenth-century Florentine business letters overwhelmingly focus on the
day-to-day details of transactions, spelling them out monotonously and repetitiously, it is
also true that they are inflected sufficiently often with the rhetorics of friendship and
fictive kinship to see these framings as constitutive of commercial interaction. This is
how Andrea Bardi could directly link the terms mercantivolemente (in a merchant-like
way) and amichevolmente (in a friendly way) in a letter111 concerning the resolution of a
differenza to the Orlandini company in Bruges on March 26, 1405. Consider the
following additional examples:
“Your offer we accept like dear friends (chari amici), and we see that by your
Tommaso you have written concerning our condition and company: this he did as
a worthy (valente) person and out of courtesy… And although you have many
friends here who serve you, nonetheless we offer ourselves to all of your
pleasures and, wanting advice concerning one thing or another, tell us and I will
do it willingly (faròllo volentieri).”112

“As much as you offer to do with love in this matter, all of it we have observed,
and we thank you for it, and we are certain you would do even more; and if
anything occurs in Avignon or here that needs to be done, we will commit
ourselves to you loyally (con fidanza), advising you of it first… As for us, you
may do with us as you would with your own, and we will do all we can. Thus we
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have told your Tommaso and prayed him to have such confidence in us as one
could with you.”113

“I will take confidence with you as I believe I may, and I would like that this
confidence remain between us.”114
In part, the language in these passages may reflect important concerns of the
theologians who elaborated the Church’s usury doctrine and whose ideas appeared in the
confessional guidebooks consulted by the laity.115 Here we have in mind specifically the
idea that the economy was constituted by a community of the faithful linked together in
love, and the theologians’ emphasis on the importance of a completely, unconditionally
free will for an economic transaction to be considered legitimate.116 But the language
here also recalls the language of patronage letters – itself undoubtedly shaped by
religious themes and imagery, but also existing as an autonomous mode of mutually
supportive social interaction. The final sentence of the Borromei letter is a common
concluding element of much correspondence, but appears with particular regularity in
patronage-related letters where writers assure recipients of their loyalty to each other.117
Amicizia was not a word that had a single, clear-cut meaning: it could be understood in
religious, in political, in economic, or even in humanistic inflections,118 depending on the
context or the multiple contexts.
Florentines saw no contradiction between friendship and making money. Theirs
was an instrumental conception of friendship.119 One purpose of helping each other was
to make money, but also one purpose of making money was to make friends, through
generosity or ‘liberality’ with gifts.120 Profit and friendship were paired concepts in the
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Florentine understanding, both facets of the same social-exchange mentality of
constructing each other through reciprocity.
Leon Battista Alberti put this idea this way, through the mouth of his businessman
character Giannozzo:
“I should be glad to remain here with you as long as you like, but I see my friend
whom I must help at the Palace. We made an appointment early this morning, and
it will soon be time to appear there. I do not wish to fail my friend, for I have
always liked helping others rather than asking for help myself, and I have always
preferred having others under obligation to me rather than the opposite. I like
doing him a favor, helping him as much as possible with words and deeds, not so
much because I know he loves me, but because I know he is a good and just man.
You must always regard good people as friends and you must always love and
help the just even though you may not know them.”121
An actual businessman from a later period phrased the idea as follows:
“With regard to Galilei and company, I see that there is no more need of
blandishments for in truth they do things like gentlemen. The letter which I have
from them now is so full, so much to the point, and so agreeable that I feel under a
permanent bond of obligation to them… Maintain close relations with them and
we over here will always perform our part duly as we do every day; of this you
and they will be the judge.”122
Out of context, one might not realize that these are businessmen talking.
Interpreting business relations as friends occurred not only when business was
going well but also when business went bad, even very bad:
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“We want only what is owed to us. May it please you also to want to do thus, and
truly, for in good faith not a little have we discussed this dispute between us. May
you or yours also wish to settle it as is done between friends. And so let it please
you that not having sent these letters [i.e., business correspondence germane to
the dispute] to [your office in] Florence, to send them without further delay.”123

“I am advised by many letters that Basciano [da Pessina] is not there. You will
have spoken with him about these blessed accounts that, by his shortcomings, are
not settled, and truly it is a great wrong; this is not the friendship (amicizia) and
brotherhood (fratelanza) that I had with him, and he has not done well in
clamming up with me (pigliare gozzo), and I don’t know why… And I must
observe that when he made accounts with me in Avignon, that amounted to
40,000 pounds or so, there was not even a penny missing, we had such a great
relationship, so that one could go so far as to say that if I owed him 1000 florins, I
would approach him and say to him how I considered him more than a brother,
and I still do. And despite what he has done to me, I will never forget the love and
brotherhood that was between him and me.”124
The ambiguous meanings of amizicia, or even of amore, were in no way precise
enough to imply what exactly to do in markets. The invocation of amicizia in business
was instead an attempted negotiation in joint cognition of empathetic understanding of
each others’ interests and an attempted negotiation in joint behavior of social-exchange
reciprocity. Words by themselves could not enforce reliable economic behavior. For that,
the social anchoring of language in actual families and in actual neighborhoods, with
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third-party observers and enforcers, was helpful. But ambiguities in shared language were
essential for the creative relational extension and groping of Renaissance businessmen
beyond the limits of their social inheritance. The language of amicizia was an important
first step in this Florentine relational extension from family and neighborhood into
markets, but by itself that dyadic trope was not sufficient for scaling up into large, farreaching and highly connected credit networks.
Onore:
Like amicizia, the word onore did not have a single unambiguous meaning in
Renaissance Florence. As was evident in our statistics, the republican conception of
onore as “public office” or “service to the state” was alive and well in the Florence of
1427. But medieval conceptions of onore as ancient lineage or as martial glory had
hardly vanished, especially among magnates. And sober guildsmen conceptions of onore
as thrift, discipline and hard work maintained their appeal, especially among new men.
Newer conceptions of onore as patronage, in the senses of liberality and magnificenza, so
prominent in the Medici regime soon to come, were starting to gain traction. Many of
these alternative meanings of onore and nobility were put into debate with each other in
the humanist dialogues of the time.125 Such multiple meanings could co-exist, because all
of them entailed the imperative of meeting all of one’s social obligations and
expectations, in one’s own eyes (character) and also in the eyes of others (reputation).
Disagreement existed, however, about the exact content of those obligations and
expectations. To the extent that the inflection was on the republican conception of onore,
service to the community was highlighted, with commercial credit flowing in recognition
of that.
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Regardless of precise inflection, business-letter discussions of honor came up
most often in times of economic trouble. Thus, for example, in a dispute concerning a
thousand florins missing because of the actions of a certain Michele, Andrea de’ Bardi
wrote to both Antonio di Sandro Cittadini and Domenico Pazzi in May of 1405 that they
should take action “for the honor of said Michele.”126 And in a letter of March 31, 1404,
Bardi wrote to Alberto Aldobrandini in Paris urging him to settle a particular deal
because it redounded to both his honor (onore) and his advantage (utile).127 In the same
letter quoted above about the Basciano deadbeat, Datini went on to assert that “I would
come back a thousand miles to do my duty towards him and every other good affair; and
it concerns his honor not to do likewise to me, even if I did not merit it.”128
In this context, complimenting someone about their honor might gain overtones of
a veiled threat about loss of that honor:
“Dearest friend, …When I was there I spoke to you many times about the money
that you owe to the heirs of your partner Antonio di Tuccio Manetti. And now
Andrea di Buonaventura has arrived there, who comes there for this reason and
for other business of his, and he has begged me that I write to you concerning this
matter, and that I pray of you that you should wish to act towards him as the
worthy man that you are. And I am quite certain it need not be said to you, that
you will pay your debt to him in this matter, both out of duty, and also to lighten
the burden on your heart. And I pray of you that you should wish to do this for
them like the worthy man that you are.”129
Indeed the question of honor was always tied, overtly or covertly, to the issue of
reputation (fama). Fama typically refers to other merchants’ collective evaluation of
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one’s interior character or soul. Gossip – either orally or through letters – was the
mechanism through which such collective evaluations were made. Such gossip could help
you:
“I, Andrea, have received letters from Ciandrello. I have told him so much about
you, and that you have done him such honor, that if something pertained to you
alone it would suffice [to obtain his help]. And if it were not already the case that
I were obligated (obrighato) to you in every respect, now I am [obligated to you]
that much more, and I thank you.”130
Or such gossip could hurt you:
“We have heard via letters from Montpelier that this Guglielmo Pigniolo has lost
the confidence [of others: avea perduto la fede]. We do not know if this is true.
These times are too dangerous. Tell us what you hear of it, and similarly how the
affairs of the Bocci are proceeding, having seen these fail and how many evils
have come this year to merchants.”131
Tommaso Spinelli provides a clear example of the link between merchant gossip
and personal anxiety about honor. In his letter to his friend Gherardo Maffei about the
setbacks he received as a Papal banker,132 Spinelli referred to his honor – as Jacks and
Caferro put it, the banker’s most precious commodity – fully six times in this letter,
sometimes in salvific terms. He wrote that the Pope “has found out the truth and has
recognized that I did my duty, and he has endorsed me as a faithful man and a good
merchant, and it is clear that I have done the greatest service to the Church of God for a
long time, and thus he absolves me and imposes silence on whosoever would speak to the
contrary.” The last part of the absolution pleased him the most, as it would clear his name
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“in the presence of merchants, and I greatly desire this strictly for honor’s sake… I will
have lost my [goods], but I will at least have conserved my honor.” All of this was driven
by Tommaso’s strong desire to leave the Pope’s employ with a good reputation for
himself (ch’io lassi buona fama di me).
The establishment and measurement of honor through gossip among businessmen
was important to the discipline of Florentine markets. But in social exchange there is also
the deeper idea of making each other through gifts. “For Paolo da Certaldo, ‘a man
without a friend is like a body without a soul’ and ‘a man who loses his friends is worse
than dead’.”133 This was no mere metaphor in Renaissance Florentine markets. Because
credit was the lifeblood of Florentine business, fellow businessmen made you by
extending credit and business to you, and they could destroy you by withdrawing that
from you. Social exchange was not orthogonal to markets; it was the discipline that made
personalistic markets work.
Republican elections to Priorate did not substitute for this process of intense
gossip among merchants about each other’s honor. Rather they built upon it by measuring
and certifying gossip about character into a public status observable by all. Election to
Priorate was not an automatic guarantee of one’s economic credit-worthiness. But it was
an institutionalized signal, backed by dense third-party networks, that even someone not
known directly by you might be worth taking a business chance on. Thereby cliquish
personal networks based on private amicizia opened out into elitist personal networks
based on public onore.
Our emphasis on the blending of economic and political logics in interpersonal
interaction in Renaissance Florence is reinforced by the widespread presence of the same
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language of raccomandazione in both business and patronage letters.134 By
raccomandazione, Florentines did not simply mean being recommended to others, and
certainly not only being recommended to others for specific tasks or opportunities.
Raccomandazione was equally, but more profoundly, a plea for recognition. To
recommend oneself to another, as Florentines so formulaically did in the conclusions of
their letters, was to ask to be remembered by another, to respect and be respected by
another. To be in a circle of raccomandazione definitely yielded material benefits, but it
also signified one’s membership in a community of people who promised to act
responsibly and supportively towards each other, in a manner similar to explicit claims to
honor. To deny the need for raccomandazione was not to deny its value, but to uphold the
certainty of its being offered. This is the cultural meaning behind Bartolomeo Rustichi’s
assertion to the Datini company in Genoa that
“We do not recommend to you very much our own affairs: it does not seem to us
necessary, but we consider you will undertake them employing such diligence as
were they your own; and this we remind you, and pray of you and we will do the
same for you.”135
Florentine businessmen in markets and Florentine politicians in state offices did
not do the same things, but they communicated in similar ways. This is perhaps not
surprising since, during the Albizzi regime of 1382-1433 in particular, there was so much
dual-role overlap between these two sets of actors.

CONCLUSION
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Neo-classical economic theory is constructed on the assumption of impersonal
markets – choices are made on the basis of goods and their prices, not on the basis of the
identities of the persons transacting. Renaissance Florentine markets did not operate like
this, especially in the most technically advanced sectors of the Florentine economy. There
is, therefore, historical need for the development of an economic theory of the operation
and evolution of personalistic markets.136
The case of Florence suggests the following elements for such a theory:
(a) Social exchange and reciprocity are the micro-mechanisms of economic
exchange, with credit being the currency. Capitalist inventions like double-entry
accounting and partnership systems formalized and perfected personal exchange,
not displaced it.
(b) Gossip about reputation provides discipline to the market, as much as do prices.
(c) The network structure of economic exchange in the market grows on the lattice of
other social networks that provide its context. Economic networks can be cliquish
and incestuous, or they can be open and expansive, depending upon how multiplenetwork feedback is arranged. Porous political-cum-social elites are helpful for
open and expansive economic markets.
(d) Political institutions are important for the development of markets not only
because of enforcement of rule of law. Depending upon details, republican
political institutions may add public transparency and efficiency to the operation
of private gossip; and they can induce the overlay of multiple social roles, such as
merchant and politician.
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(e) Linguistic and network ambiguity induces creative exploration and innovation in
social relationships, even as it enables free riding and lies. Policing the latter
should not be so strict as to squelch the former.
How much these findings generalize to other historical and comparative settings
remains to be explored in depth, but we suspect their widespread applicability.
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Alberti libri mastri of 1348-59, published and analyzed by Richard A. Goldthwaite, Enzo Settesoldi, and
Marco Spallanzani (eds.), Due libri mastri degli Alberti: una grande compagnia di Calimala, 1348-1358
(Firenze: 1995). In particular, “Accounts with other firms or outside persons were opened, for the most
part, for single transactions. If later a client presented himself another time, the accountant of the Alberti
preferred to open new accounts.” (p. 113) Truly on-going current accounts did exist in the 1348-59 Alberti
libri mastri, but only for Alberti family members and for company employees (so-called conti interni).
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without money. In dealing with them, he said, one never sees or touches any money; all they need to do
business is paper, pen, and ink.” De Roover (1944), p. 381. Goldthwaite in his forthcoming book, The
Economy of Renaissance Florence, chapter 6, discusses the use of “offset” among private Florentine
individuals, as a form of “banking” outside of banks, without making any reference to anthropological
social exchange. We thank Richard Goldthwaite for pre-publication access to this impressively broad and
deeply researched work, the capstone of a brilliant career. We would add that “offset” (or as we would say
“relational credit”) behavior was characteristic of the core of Florentine merchant banking, as well as of
Florentines as private citizens. The fact that the same lending behavior was characteristic both of
businesses in markets and of private people in their friendships reinforces our point about the homology
between capitalist business corrispondenti and social-exchange.
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The converse of economic logic bleeding into the social domain is evident in the famous Florentine

family diaries or ricordanze, which rhetorically mix family narrative histories and family account books.
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Three well documented examples of this company plasticity are these:
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(a) On the subject of domestic banks, Sergio Tognetti usefully has corrected one of Raymond de
Roover’s few mistakes. Sergio Tognetti, “L’attività di banca locale di una grande compagnia
fiorentina del XV secolo,” Archivio Storico Italiano 155 (1997): 595-648. De Roover (1966), p.
14-15, had argued, very influentially, that Florentine banks were sharply divided into three distinct
and unrelated types: banchi di pegno (pawnshops), banchi a minuto (small domestic banks), and
banchi grossi (large international banks). De Roover himself studied only the latter. Based on a
careful study of the extensive account books of the Cambini bank, Tognetti instead argued that
overlap of the latter two types was substantial: international banks frequently had domestic bank
branches, and domestic banks frequently were involved in lucrative international business. Our
catasto data, based on 100% of the banks extant in 1427, strongly supports the position of
Tognetti. On the other hand, Goldthwaite’s study of the small Cerchi banco a minuto in the 1450s
reinforces de Roover’s original description. Richard A. Goldthwaite, “Local Banking in
Renaissance Florence,” The Journal of European Economic History 14 (1985): 5-55. The
resolution of this confusion is simple: there were two types of ‘domestic banks’, one of which was
involved intimately in international business, and one of which was not. Our data on credits to and
from the Domestic Bank industry are dominated by the former type of bank, because those banks
were much bigger and more central in the Florentine economy than were the banchi a minuto, in
1427 at least.
(b) The fifteenth-century business and career of Andrea Banchi, thoroughly studied by Florence Edler
de Roover, is a clear example of this industrial fluidity of Florentine firms: Florence Edler de
Roover, “Andrea Banchi, Florentine Silk Manufacturer and Merchant in the Fifteenth Century,”
Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History 3 (1966): 223-85. Banchi without any doubt was a
silk manufacturer (setaiuolo). Nonethless, as Banchi went around all over Europe searching for
silk-cocoon raw materials to buy and silk cloth to sell, he sometimes was paid in wool or other
commodities, of which then he had to dispose (p. 271). Banchi also acted like a banker, giving
loans at interest to other setaiuoli “competitors” and to merchant-bankers (p. 227).
(c) The Maringhi correspondence (Richards, Gertrude (ed.), Florentine Merchants in the Age of the
Medici: Letters and Documents from the Selfridge Collection of Medici Manuscripts. Cambridge,
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Mass.: 1932) similarly has numerous examples of how the core woolen-cloth-for-raw-silk
exchange was augmented with all sorts of other goods flowing between the parties: various types
of cloth, ribbons, cotton, rugs, pepper, rhubarb, drugs, fox pelts, horses, cheese, sausage, even
caviar (the latter four items seeming very close to personal gifts). Indeed in the Maringhi
correspondence it seems clear that the stronger the personal relationship between the traders, the
wider the range of commodities exchanged.
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dates on which credits were initiated. One entry, a credit he had with the firm of Zanobi di Gherardo
Corigiani & Co. for fifty-three florins, is crossed out and marked pagato on May 20. Subsequently, he
records a credit with the same firm dated November 14. It is certain, therefore, that these reported
relational-credit figures underestimate the ‘true’ rate, were it possible to include ‘repeat business’ in our
operational definition of relational exchange.
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been observed had the observation time been longer.
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Table 1. CENSUS OF 1427 COMPANIES/PARTNERSHIPS IN MAJOR INDUSTRIES
High Certainty Companies
Florence

Low Certainty Companies

Overseas

Old

Florence

Overseas

Old

International
Merchant-Banks

0

45

7

0

10

2

Pisa Merchant
trading companies

0

20

1

0

1

0

Domestic banks &
Merchant-Banks

53

0

10

12

0

4

Cloth Retail

32

3

5

4

1

2

Silk Production

38

8

4

11

1

1

36
27
8
9
34
114

5
0
0
0
4
9

10
2
0
1
9
22

2
1
0
0
21
24

0
0
0
0
4
4

0
0
0
0
4
4

18

0

3

7

0

2

Other Industries (partial)
Fur
6
Gold
3
Linaioli
6
Merciai
6
Rigattieri
7
Speziali
11
Miscellaneous
6

0
0
0
1
1
0
1

0
0
0
0
0
2
5

4
5
10
5
4
1
6

0
0
1
1
0
0
0

0
0
0
1
1
0
1

9

9

10

110

20

15

312

94

69

203

39

33

Wool Production
San Martino
Via Maggio
San Pancrazio
San Pier Scheraggio
Unclear Location
All Wool Firms
Cloth Dyers

Unknown
Industry
Totals

68
Table 2. CAPITAL STRUCTURE OF 1427 CATASTO COMPANIES
A. Average Capital/Corpo Size of Companies, in florins:

n

corpo1=
corpo
only

corpo2=
corpo3=
corpo1
corpo2
+ profit
+ inventory
+ sopraccorpo

Merchant Banks
(Int’l. + Pisa)
Domestic Merchant Banks

23

5080

5751

6973

24

6375

9941

10119

Cloth Retail

21

4305

5348

7102

Silk Manufacturing

25

3568

3928

4851

Wool Manufacturing
(San Martino)
Wool Manufacturing
(other)
Cloth Dyeing

30

3239

3654

4373

24

2030

2233

2517

8

1095

1195

1595

B. Average Leverage = Σi (total debt) / Σi (capital):
n

corpo1=
corpo
only

corpo2=
corpo3=
corpo1
corpo2
+ profit
+ inventory
+ sopraccorpo

Merchant Banks
(Int’l. + Pisa)
Domestic Merchant Banks

12

5.42

4.98

3.62

14

4.93

3.29

3.20

Cloth Retail

14

2.20

1.66

1.15

Silk Manufacturing

19

0.94

0.86

0.66

Wool Manufacturing
(San Martino)
Wool Manufacturing
(other)
Cloth Dyeing

23

1.17

1.04

0.84

16

0.54

0.48

0.41

7

2.27

2.03

1.44
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Table 3. SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF CREDITS (when known)
A. Among Merchant-Banks and Banks:
Relational
Credits:

Transactional
Credits:

Specialization of Credits:
(when two contents known)

70 Accounts
17 Banking activities
19 Merchandise
19 Cloth
16 Raw materials
5 Other

17 Accounts
16 Banking activities
6 Merchandise
6 Cloth
3 Raw materials
4 Other

51 Different categories
21 Similar: Accounts
45 Similar: Other categories

B. Between Merchant-Banks and Others:
Relational
Credits:

Transactional
Credits:

Specialization of Credits:
(when two contents known)

17 Accounts
8 Banking activities
3 Merchandise
45 Cloth
28 Raw materials
0 Other

10 Accounts
27 Banking activities
4 Merchandise
38 Cloth
52 Raw materials
3 Other

5 Different categories
7 Similar: Accounts
19 Similar: Other categories

Relational
Credits:

Transactional
Credits:

Specialization of Credits:
(when two contents known)

0 Accounts
3 Banking activities
0 Merchandise
15 Cloth
1 Raw materials
0 Other

2 Accounts
4 Banking activities
1 Merchandise
34 Cloth
14 Raw materials
4 Other

C. Among Others:

0 Different categories
0 Similar: Accounts
2 Similar: Other categories

N.B.: “Merchant-Banks” = Florentine merchant-banks resident abroad, Florentine
merchant trading companies resident in Pisa, Florentine merchant-banks
resident in Florence, and domestic cambio banks resident in Florence.
“Others” = Cloth Retailers, Silk Producers, Wool Producers: San Martino,
Wool Producers: Other conventi, and Cloth Dyers
“Specialization” = contents in similar or different categories, when two contents known.
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Table 4. VOLUME OF CREDITS: RELATIONS VS. TRANSACTIONS
A. Reciprocal Credits:
debtor companies:
creditor
Banks
companies:

All Other
Companies

Total

Banks

427/953 = .448

117/749 = .156

544/1702 = .320

All Other
Companies

115/662 = .174

232/1959 = .118

347/2621 = .132

Total

542/1615 = .336

349/2708 = .129

891/4323 = .206

B. Multiple Credits:
debtor companies:
creditor
Banks
companies:

All Other
Companies

Total

Banks

474/953 = .497

169/749 = .226

643/1702 = .378

All Other
Companies

160/662 = .242

400/1959 = .204

560/2621 = .214

Total

634/1615 = .393

569/2708 = .210

1203/4323 = .278

C. Relational Credits:
debtor companies:
creditor
Banks
companies:

All Other
Companies

Total

Banks

601/953 = .631

234/749 = .312

835/1702 = .491

All Other
Companies

230/662 = .347

562/1959 = .287

792/2621 = .302

Total

831/1615 = .514

796/2708 = .294

1627/4323 = .376

N.B.: C is the union of A and B.
“Banks” equals {Int’l. m-banks, Pisa merchants, and Domestic m-b and banks}.
“All Other Companies” equals {Cloth Retail, Silk Producers, Wool producers:
both San Martino and other conventi, and Dyers}.

Table 5. Extract/summary of significant coefficients from logit regressions on company credit in on-line Appendix
A. All credits (dichotomous)
Between
Partnership
part. systems Systems
Market:
Int’l. M-B / Silk
Int’l. M-B / Wool
Int’l. Merch.-bank
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B
Dom. Merch.-bank
Dom. M-B / Wool
Dom. M-B / Silk
Silk
Wool
Ritagliatori / Wool
Ritagliatori
Ritagliatori / Silk

Nuclear
Family

Patrilineage
Family

Parentado
Family

Gonfalone

Priorate

3.128**
***

6.496
6.945**
5.291*

13.726***
15.455**

5.534***
3.662**

5.571**
3.288*

Political
factions

.00225**

M: 5.943***
A: 2.905***

2.721***
1.822*

4.268*

Scrutiny
(1433)

1.974**

1.374***
1.486***
.635*
1.071***

2.118***
1.471***

M: 2.305***
.00165**
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B. Reciprocal credits
Between
Partnership
part. systems Systems

Market:
Int’l. M-B / Silk
Int’l. M-B / Wool
Int’l. Merch.-bank
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B
Dom. Merch-bank
1.110***
Dom. M-B / Wool
Dom. M-B / Silk
Silk
Wool
Ritagliatori / Wool
Ritagliatori
Ritagliatori / Silk

C. Non-reciprocal credits
Between
Market:
part. systems
Int’l. M-B / Silk
Int’l. M-B / Wool
Int’l. Merch.-bank
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B
Dom. Merch.-bank
Dom. M-B / Wool
Dom. M-B / Silk
Silk
Wool
Ritagliatori / Wool
Ritagliatori
Ritagliatori / Silk

7.322***
6.881***
10.831**
12.763**

Nuclear
Family
22.105***
5.937***
3.202**

Patrilineage
Family
8.064**
14.774***
3.526**

Parentado
Family
2.559**
5.633**
2.542

*

3.739*
13.902

**

Gonfalone

Priorate

.00817***
.00494**
**

1.426
1.801**
2.266***
2.303***

*

2.547

2.684**
2.969***

8.542**

Partnership
Systems
9.182*

Nuclear
Family
18.013*

Scrutiny
(1433)

A: 2.276*
M: 3.793***
M: 4.351***

.00357*

Patrilineage
Family

Parentado
Family

Gonfalone

Priorate

Scrutiny
(1433)
.00213*

1.080**
5.182**

Political
factions
M: 6.380*

2.148**

1.232**
1.075**

Political
factions
M: 6.084***
A: 3.169***

1.796**
1.861***
.00166**
A: 4.010*

**

***

14.484

5.942
3.707*
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Table 6. Volume of “Personal” credits for all merchant-banking markets, by clusters of significant coefficients
Percentage merchant-banking credits with independent variables not equal to zero in significant coefficients listed in table 5:
Partnershipsystem transfers:

Family
embedding:

Neighborhood
embedding:

Political
embedding:

All
together:

A. All credits
Domestic Merch. Banking
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B
Dom. M-B / Wool
Dom. M-B / Silk
International Merch. Bk.
Int’l. M-B / Wool
Int’l. M-B / Silk

3 / 260 = .012
55 / 339 = .162
0 / 336 = .000
0 / 258 = .000
35 / 294 = .119
0 / 359 = .000
0 / 166 = .000

29 / 260 = .112
39 / 339 = .115
0 / 336 = .000
3 / 258 = .012
91 / 294 = .310
27 / 359 = .075
9 / 166 = .054

79 / 260 = .304
147 / 339 = .434
80 / 336 = .238
53 / 258 = .205
0 / 294 = .000
0 / 359 = .000
0 / 166 = .000

232 / 260 = .892
261 / 339 = .770
0 / 336 = .000
0 / 258 = .000
0 / 294 = .000
10 / 359 = .028
13 / 166 = .078

239 / 260 = .919
287 / 339 = .847
80 / 336 = .238
55 / 258 = .213
110 / 294 = .374
36 / 359 = .100
19 / 166 = .114

B. Reciprocal credits
(single + multiple)
Domestic Merch. Banking
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B
Dom. M-B / Wool
Dom. M-B / Silk
International Merch. Bk.
Int’l. M-B / Wool
Int’l. M-B / Silk

63 / 107 = .589
49 / 158 = .310
15 / 52 = .288
0 / 60 = .000
32 / 134 = .239
0 / 41 = .000
0 / 30 = .000

2 / 107 = .019
39 / 158 = .247
2 / 52 = .038
2 / 60 = .033
56 / 134 = .418
17 / 41 = .415
2 / 30 = .067

33 / 107 = .308
95 / 158 = .601
27 / 52 = .519
19 / 60 = .317
0 / 134 = .000
0 / 41 = .000
0 / 30 = .000

0 / 107 = .000
130 / 158 = .823
50 / 52 = .962
52 / 60 = .867
23 / 134 = .172
0 / 41 = .000
2 / 30 = .067

72 / 107 = .673
143 / 158 = .905
50 / 52 = .962
56 / 60 = .933
73 / 134 = .545
17 / 41 = .415
2 / 30 = .067
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Partnershipsystem transfers:
C. Non-reciprocal credits
(single + multiple)
Domestic Merch. Banking
Dom. M-B / Int’l. M-B
Dom. M-B / Wool
Dom. M-B / Silk
International Merch. Bk.
Int’l. M-B / Wool
Int’l. M-B / Silk

0 / 153 = .000
0 / 181 = .000
0 / 284 = .000
0 / 198 = .000
0 / 160 = .000
0 / 318 = .000
4 / 136 = .029

Family
embedding:

Neighborhood
embedding:

16 / 153 = .105
0 / 181 = .000
0 / 284 = .000
3 / 198 = .015
0 / 160 = .000
0 / 318 = .000
1 / 136 = .007

46 / 153 = .301
52 / 181 = .287
0 / 284 = .000
0 / 198 = .000
0 / 160 = .000
68 / 318 = .214
0 / 136 = .000

Political
embedding:

All
together:

132 / 153 = .863
118 / 181 = .652
0 / 284 = .000
6 / 198 = .030
0 / 160 = .000
10 / 318 = .031
11 / 136 = .081

137 / 153 = .895
137 / 181 = .757
0 / 284 = .000
9 / 198 = .045
0 / 160 = .000
76 / 318 = .239
15 / 136 = .110

N.B.: “Partnership-system transfers” includes samepart & between_part_sys > 0, when significant.
“Family embedding” includes samenuclnp & samefamnn & sameinlaw & sametado > 0, when significant.
“Neighborhood embedding” includes samegonf > 0, when significant.
“Political embedding” includes cdprior_pct_lt427 & sammedici & samolig > 0, when significant. [Not scrutiny]
“All together” includes samepart & between_partsys & samenuclnp & samefamnn & sameinlaw & sametado & samegonf &
cdprior_pct_lt427 & sammedici & samolig > 0, when significant.
.000 entries indicate lack of statistical significance, in the first place.

Figure 1. INPUT-OUTPUT VOLUME OF CREDITS BETWEEN INDUSTRIES:
shown if [(Observed Credits - Expected Credits) / (Expected Credits)] > .10
+1.592
MB
Intl

+.630

+.945
+.288

+.534

+.335

Dm
Bk.

+.379

+1.011

Pisa
Merch.

+.177

+.405
+.122

+.215
+1.619

+.165

Slk

Wool,
S.M.

+.724

+.960
+.218

+.153

Cloth
Retail

+1.225
+.691

+2.182

+1.828

+.234
Wool,
Other

+3.214
+.167

Cloth
Dyers
N.B.: [(O-E) / E] controls for raw volume of credit effects. Dotted lines show weaker ratios.

+.108
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On-line Appendix: Figure 1. Pajek network visualization of 1427 commercial-credit data
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Color code for figure 1:
Blue dots = Silk manufacturing companies
Yellow dots = Wool manufacturing companies, San Martino convento (higher quality)
Burnt yellow dots = Wool manufacturing companies other conventi (lower quality)
Brown dots = Cloth retail (ritagliatori) companies
White dots = Cloth dyeing (tintori) companies
Red dots = Domestic banks and merchant-banks, resident in Florence
Green dots = International Florentine merchant-banks, resident abroad
Light green dots = International Florentine merchant companies, resident in Pisa
Grey dots = Companies with unclear industrial affiliation
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On-line Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
A. Among Domestic Merchant-banker companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

5.291*
.302

10.831**
1.110***

[dropped]
-.079

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

4.268*
1.974**
7.693**
-.486

-1.717
-2.941
8.535**
[dropped]

5.182**
2.148**
4.815
.827

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

1.486***
.068

1.801**
-.956

1.075**
.353

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

-.288
-.903
-.734

-.395
-3.042(*)
[dropped]

-.169
-.255
-.283

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

1.471***
-.935*
-.349
.071
-.286

1.232
.023
-.837
.570
1.043

1.861***
-1.401*
.260
-.455
-1.289

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00133

.00202

.00096

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

1.806(*)
1.063

1.934
2.804

.857
-5.591
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
A. Among Domestic Merchant-banker companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

4.922***
.450
.506(*)
2.95e-6
2.28e-6

3.007***
.891*
.724
-2.88e-6
3.87e-6

3.568***
.362
.619*
5.74e-6
3.18e-6

Constant:

-4.994***

-7.200***

-5.091***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

2,756
186
-502.8
913.1
24
.0000
.262

2,756
62
-210.6
566.5
22
.0000
.290

2,756
124
-419.7
317.7
23
.0000
.170

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

186
260

62
107

124
153

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.40
100%

1.73
41.2%

1.23
58.8%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
B. Among International Merchant-banker companies: (International m-b + Pisa m-b)
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

6.496***
.123

7.322***
-.217

-.258
.315

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

3.662**
2.721***
-.940
.322

5.937***
3.526**
-1.920
1.784

.375
.752
-.571
.388

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

.714
.100

.671
.255

.648
.002

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

-.010
1.764***
-.160

-.215
1.996**
.565

.025
1.472*
-.418

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

-1.248
.741
.646
-.756
.704

-6.409*
5.551*
-2.007
-2.698
.747

.463
-.744
1.007
.876
.169

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00145

.00494**

-.00031

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

-.176
-.191

2.499
2.276*

-1.840
[dropped]
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
B. Among International Merchant-banker companies: (International m-b + Pisa m-b)
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

4.215***
.810***
.733***
0.06e-6
-0.75e-6

3.659***
.848*
.732(*)
-4.63e-6
2.68e-6

2.652***
.662**
.714**
1.04e-6
-1.45e-6

Constant:

-5.309***

-7.337***

-5.005***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

4,160
201
-602.5
360.6
24
.0000
.252

4,160
76
-248.2
569.6
24
.0000
.346

4,160
125
-484.4
174.6
23
.0000
.137

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

201
294

76
134

125
160

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.46
100%

1.76
45.6%

1.28
54.4%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
C. Between Domestic & International Merchant-banker companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

6.945**
.199

6.881***
.277

-1.216
.255

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

2.023
1.211(*)
-2.714
1.822*

3.202**
1.075
-3.654
2.542*

-.312
1.218
-.062
.782

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

1.374***
.172

1.426**
.227

1.232**
.099

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

.204
-.378
.223

.269
-.166
.482

.134
-.638
-.012

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

2.118***
-1.169(*)
-1.116
.054
.339

2.547*
.239
-2.887*
-1.167
-.138

1.796**
-1.724*
-.284
.501
.551

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00094

.00094

.00117

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

2.305***
1.357

3.793***
-.722

.921
1.543
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
C. Between Domestic and International Merchant-banker companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

2.931***
.489*
.670**
6.94e-6*
6.15e-6**

1.536***
.928**
.560
11.1e-6**
10.6e-6**

2.035**
.397
.832**
6.08e-6
5.16e-6*

Constant:

-5.435***

-7.186***

-5.684***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

5,830
211
-712.3
243.1
24
.0000
.215

5,830
67
-267.2
376.8
24
.0000
.270

5,830
144
-584.2
139.8
24
.0000
.135

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

211
339

67
158

144
181

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.61
100%

2.36
46.6%

1.26
53.4%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
D. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

8.340
.220

12.763**
.208

2.800
.254

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

2.257
.083
8.534
-4.213

-3.144*
[dropped]
[dropped]
3.739**

3.990
.863
11.754
-6.332

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

.635*
.219

2.266***
1.332*

.202
.067

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

-.538**
-.129
.786*

-.568
-2.476**
-.591

-.566*
.042
.890**

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

1.111
-1.185**
-.620
.610
.719

2.684**
1.938*
-3.404*
-.668
1.095

.987
-1.551***
-.314
.921(*)
.520

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00165**

.00198

.00166**

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

1.123
-4.412

4.351***
[dropped]

-.944
-2.593
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
D. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

7.525***
.528
.435**
5.93e-6*
2.75e-6

3.137**
1.181(*)
1.832*
5.83e-6
13.2e-6(*)

6.262***
.544
.373*
6.70e-6**
3.21e-6

Constant:

-5.798***

-11.117***

-5.706***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

13,037
294
-1022.8
431.7
27
.0000
.272

13,037
34
-160.3
436.6
21
.0000
.321

13,037
260
-994.6
355.9
24
.0000
.220

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties
Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

294
336
1.14
100%

34
52
1.53
15.5%

260
284
1.09
84.5%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
E. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

12.242
.097

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

6.284
-1.133
30.999**
-4.762

13.902**
-2.866
[dropped]
[dropped]

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

1.071***
.390

2.303***
-1.947**

.229
.714*

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

-.339
.082
.550

.441
-1.406
.065

-.619*
.207
.728*

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

.554
-.674
.442
.319
-.754

2.969***
.226
-1.497
-2.409*
-2.219

-.105
-.861
1.158(*)
.432
-.302

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00062

.00027

.00075

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

2.825
2.544

[dropped]
[dropped]

4.301(*)
4.010*

.875
.001

14.831
.140

.567
-2.066
30.347***
-2.445
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
E. Between Domestic Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

5.982***
.883**
.515
-0.23e-6
-2.31e-6

4.190***
.566
.983
7.75e-6
9.71e-6(*)

4.794***
1.085**
.515*
0.43e-6
-9.17e-6

Constant:

-5.365***

-7.415***

-5.639***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

4,770
219
-638.7
352.6
24
.0000
.281

4,770
46
-175.6
162.7
20
.0000
.323

4,770
173
-575.1
243.6
24
.0000
.227

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

219
258

46
60

173
198

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.18
100%

1.30
23.3%

1.14
76.7%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
F. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

5.361
.224

5.747
.021

5.435
.210

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

5.534***
1.112
5.899*
-1.080

22.105***
14.774***
-3.503
5.633**

-3.981
-2.220
7.809
-2.589

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

.770
.493*

-10.064***
2.013***

1.080**
.263

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

-.101
.102
-.327

-.029
1.632
2.475*

-.080
.027
-.856

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

-1.069
-.327
-.566
.766
1.378*

.835
-4.696**
1.831
-2.929**
4.633**

-1.225(*)
.027
-.913
1.074*
1.129

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00089

.00817***

.00023

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

-2.069
2.905***

-5.466
[dropped]

-.998
3.169***

89
Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
F. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

8.410***
.816***
1.094***
0.50e-6
-10.0e-6*

2.433***
1.352*
1.233*
-3.42e-6
-1.23e-6

7.639***
.755***
1.190***
1.92e-6
-11.1e-6**

Constant:

-6.611***

-11.912***

-6.445***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

15,990
300
-743.5
983.6
24
.0000
.501

15,990
30
-126.2
315.9
23
.0000
.422

15,990
270
-724.0
776.3
24
.0000
.471

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties
Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

300
359
1.20
100%

30
41
1.37
11.4%

270
318
1.18
88.6%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
G. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

6.083
-.480

[dropped]
-.795

9.182*
-.683

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

12.963
3.128**
-.481
1.126

[dropped]
8.064**
[dropped]
2.559**

18.013*
1.502
1.353
.718

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

-.893
.350

-4.296*
-1.684*

-.474
.602*

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

.071
.682*
.992*

.212
-.348
2.181*

.067
.819*
.731

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

-.546
.502
-1.132
1.059
-.561

.729
4.707***
-4.686**
-2.323
4.194*

-1.033
-.781
-.107
1.826*
-1.855

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00225**

.00353

.00213*

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

5.943***
-1.196

6.380*
[dropped]

6.084***
-.789

91

Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
G. Between Int’l. Merchant-banker companies and Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

8.217***
.469
.601*
2.32e-6
-14.7e-6*

4.246***
.927
1.003
5.55e-6
2.73e-6

8.009***
.475
.517
2.17e-6
-17.8e-6**

Constant:

-5.868***

-9.021***

-5.907***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

5,850
146
-455.7
362.1
24
.0000
.333

5,850
24
-117.7
235.0
20
.0000
.245

5,850
122
-396.2
339.7
24
.0000
.332

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

146
166

24
30

122
136

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.14
100%

1.25
18.1%

1.12
81.9%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
H. Among Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)
i
13.726***
n
14.484***
-.409
s
-.628
u
f
f
3.707*
3.288*
1.952
i
1.342
2.800
c
2.665
-.792
i
-.473
e
n
-.201
t
-.313
.191
.273
c
r
-.013
e
-.040
.010
d
.093
.227
i
-.016
t
s
.539
.534
.079
.094
-.276
-.089
-.410
-.567
-.476
-.786

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

-.00020

-.00050

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

-.206
[dropped]

.187
[dropped]

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems
Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family
Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)
Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
H. Among Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

9.881***
1.071***
.738**
2.76e-6
2.34e-6

Constant:

-6.195***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

15,004
204
-827.3
243.3
23
.0000
.234

i
n
s
u
f
f.

9.430***
1.007**
.642*
3.34e-6
2.73e-6
-6.027***

c
r
e
d
i
t
s

15,004
190
-790.6
249.7
23
.0000
.224

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

204
216

14
14

190
202

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.06
100%

1.00
6.5%

1.06
93.5%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
I. Among Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)
i
[dropped]
n
[dropped]
[dropped]
s
[dropped]
u
f
f
5.942**
5.571**
[dropped]
i
[dropped]
[dropped]
c
[dropped]
[dropped]
i
[dropped]
e
n
.038
t
-.244
-.648*
-.539
c
r
-.709
e
-.514
-.165
d
-.210
-.703
i
-.576
t
s
.370
.961
-.445
-.516
.682
.600
-.224
-.421
-2.019**
-1.957**

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00057

.00009

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

8.621
.950

8.979
1.357

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems
Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family
Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)
Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
I. Among Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

7.453***
.892*
.405
-9.76e-6
-9.92e-6

Constant:

-4.450***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

1,980
146
-383.6
468.5
19
.0000
.264

i
n
s
u
f
f.

7.325***
.798
.318
-6.83e-6
-10.7e-6
-4.328***

c
r
e
d
i
t
s

1,980
138
-370.5
332.6
19
.0000
.260

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

146
153

8
8

138
145

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.05
100%

1.00
5.2%

1.05
94.8%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
J. Among Ritagliatori companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

15.455
.373

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

5.037(*)
.251
6.224*
2.099

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

1.168
.336

**

i
n
s
u
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
c
r
e
d
i
t
s

9.361
.145

1.100
1.037
[dropped]
-.194

.140
.263

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

.766
.617
-1.216

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

-.327
.651
.106
.603
-1.260

-.855
.432
.794
.683
-2.703

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

-.00191

-.00156

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

-4.209
[dropped]

-1.427
[dropped]

.950
1.061*
-1.439
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
J. Among Ritagliatori companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

7.141**
2.008**
.711*
0.10e-6
-13.2e-6

Constant:

-6.033***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

i
n
s
u
f
f.

6.597**
1.993**
.505
17.1e-6
4.99e-6
-6.299***

c
r
e
d
i
t
s

1,190
62
-168.0
2505.3
23
.0000
.310

1,190
54
-164.6
1211.7
22
.0000
.251

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

62
66

8
9

54
57

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.06
100%

1.12
13.6%

1.06
86.4%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
K. Between Ritagliatori companies and Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

-1.203
.253

[dropped]
-.327

4.415
.320

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

4.384
1.865
[dropped]
-12.981

8.542**
[dropped]
[dropped]
[dropped]

.138
2.180
[dropped]
-9.552

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

-.023
.311(*)

-3.233*
.284

.195
.240

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

-.006
.179
.032

.406
.349
-.438

-.111
.241
-.060

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

.127
-.254
.265
.049
-.242

-.222
-.738
.353
-.585
3.301*

.249
-.240
.313
.207
-.988

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

.00039

.00357*

-.00093

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

-.458
[dropped]

-2.765
[dropped]

.365
[dropped]
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
K. Between Ritagliatori companies and Wool manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

5.997***
.245
.139
-6.24e-6
-0.54e-6

1.563***
1.241*
1.073*
14.8e-6
14.0e-6*

5.268***
.226
.097
-12.1e-6
-4.27e-6

Constant:

-4.010***

-8.707***

-3.744***

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

8,608
722
-1588.2
425.8
22
.0000
.360

8,608
66
-308.4
215.8
19
.0000
.204

8,608
656
-1572.6
248.3
22
.0000
.322

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

722
880

66
92

656
788

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.22
100%

1.39
10.5%

1.20
89.5%
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
L. Between Ritagliatori companies and Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Partnership system:
Within system (shared partner)
Between systems

[dropped]
.059

[dropped]
[dropped]

[dropped]
.616

Kinship:
Nuclear family (excl. self)
Patrilineal family (excl. nuclear)
In-law nuclear family
In-law parentado family

[dropped]
[dropped]
3.023
[dropped]

[dropped]
[dropped]
[dropped]
[dropped]

[dropped]
[dropped]
3.909
[dropped]

Neighborhood:
Same Gonfalone
Same Quarter (excl. gonfalone)

-1.124
-.713

-.439
-1.334

-1.287
-.572

Social Class:
Popolani + Magnates
New men + New-new men
Families not admitted to priorate

.063
.391
1.141*

.480
.131
-.778

-.311
.511
1.471**

Political Offices: (% first)
Priorate (pre-1427)
Buonuomini (pre-1427)
Gonfalonieri (pre-1427)
Guild consuls (pre-1427)
Mercanzia (pre-1427)

.294
-.617
.748
-.208
-2.209*

-.013
-1.800
1.425
-.958
.193

.528
-.328
.587
-.025
-3.280*

Scrutiny votes (1433):
Max cred ptnr. + max debt ptnr.

-.00014

-.00158

-.00021

Political Factions:
Medici party (1433)
Albizzi party (1433)

.980
[dropped]

[dropped]
[dropped]

2.874
[dropped]
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Appendix: PREDICTING COMMERCIAL CREDIT: Logit Regressions
Dependent variable = dichotomized company credits (i.e., credits received or not)
L. Between Ritagliatori companies and Silk manufacturing companies:
Independent
variables:

all credit = reciprocal + asymmetric
relations
credits
credits
(mult.+single)

Statistical controls:
Expected credits, firm size only
Creditor’s accounts seen
Debtor’s accounts seen
Creditor partners’ wealth
Debtor partners’ wealth

7.883***
1.573***
-.001
5.80e-6
9.74e-6

3.839***
1.163*
.777
20.9e-6
28.8e-6

7.054***
1.490**
-.035
1.89e-6
-0.44e-6

Constant:

-5.531***

-6.743***

-5.576***

3,150
126
-370.5
177.2
19
.0000
.300

3,150
26
-126.0
135.6
16
.0000
.164

3,150
100
-317.0
163.9
19
.0000
.285

Number of observations (dyads)
Number of non-zero observations
Log likelihood
Wald chi-square
Number of parameters
Probability > chi-square
Pseudo R-squared

N.B: Cluster option in Stata used to control for unobserved company
heterogeneity.
Number of trading ties
Number of credits in trading ties

126
141

26
32

100
109

Average number of credits per tie
Percentage of total credits

1.12
100%

1.23
22.7%

1.09
77.3%

